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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ] 
vs. ) 
EVAN B. ANDERSON, ] 
Defendant/Appellant. ) 
> CaseNo.981674-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated §77-18a-l(a) and §78-2a-3(2)(e), 1953, as amended. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Did the trial court err in not granting defendant's motion to dismiss, made at 
the close of plaintiffs case in chief, for failure to prove the elements of the charges of 
contracting without a license, Utah Code Annotated §58-55-501(1) and filing for a 
building permit without a license, Utah Code Annotated §58-55-501(4)? 
II. Did the trial court err when it did not grant the defendant's motion for a 
Bill of Particulars? 
III. Did the trial court err in terminating a previous consolidation order? 
IV: Did the trial court err by allowing O. J. Peck, investigator with the 
Contractor's Licensing Section of the Utah Department of Commerce Division of 
Occupational & Professional Licensing, to testify about interpretations of the licensing 
laws and how the defendant violated these laws? 
V: Did the trial court err in allowing O. J. Peck, investigator with the 
Contractor's Licensing Section of the Utah Department of Commerce Division of 
Occupational & Professional Licensing, to refresh his memory from his reports? 
VI: Did the trial court err in allowing O. J. Peck, investigator with the 
Contractor's Licensing Section of the Utah Department of Commerce Division of 
Occupational & Professional Licensing, to testify about other dates when the defendant 
had been licensed? 
VII: Did the jury err in finding the defendant guilty of Contracting without a 
License, in violation of §58-55-501(1) and Applying for a Building Permit without a 
License, in violation of §58-55-501(4)? 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY 
PROVISIONS CONSIDERED 
DETERMINATIVE 
Utah Code Annotated §§58-55-501(1) and 58-55-501(4). 
All statutory references in this brief are to Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On June 12, 1996, Joe and Myrle Mellen entered into a contract with Evan 
Anderson, the defendant/appellant in this action. The contract specified that the Mellens 
would get a Skyline modular home; concrete for home, garage and shed; construction of 
garage and shed; as well as excavating and grading; septic tank with percolation tests; 
driveway, asphalt paving; water trench two freeze hydrants, and power trench for a total 
cost of $136,384.45. The Mellens had already purchased from the defendant Lot 3 
Harmony Views Unit IV subdivision, upon which the home and other improvements were 
to be placed. 
At the time the contract was entered into, the defendant was licensed only to do 
excavating and grading, landscaping and pipeline and conduit work. On that date neither 
the defendant nor his company, Construction and Sales Management, was licensed as a 
general contractor. 
The Mellens dealt only with the defendant throughout the process of developing 
their lot, until they became dissatisfied with some of the work performed by the 
defendant and they hired Gene Beatty to finish the concrete work. In fact, all work done 
on the lot and fixtures of the Mellen home was done by the defendant or by those hired 
by the defendant, and the defendant, Evan Anderson, collected the entire $136,384.45 
contract price for that purpose. 
Sometime in August of 1996 a building permit application was faxed to the 
Washington County Building Department concerning the Mellen property. The fax came 
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from the office of Evan Anderson in New Harmony, Utah. With it came information 
concerning water right, building plans, septic system plans, and approval for 
improvements from Harmony Views signed by Evan Anderson, the defendant. These 
materials were consistent with the materials always filed by the defendant by fax. The 
building permit application listed the contractor as Spectra Construction Company, a 
licensed general contractor, and was approved on September 3, 1996. The permit was 
picked up by Amelia M. Anderson, a daughter of the defendant, who signed the 
application claiming to be the authorized agent for Spectra. When Washington County 
Building Inspector Bill Weaver later questioned the defendant about his relationship with 
Spectra Construction, the defendant stated that he was a part owner of Spectra, that 
Spectra was acting on his behalf, and that he (the defendant) was acting under Spectra's 
license. In fact, the defendant, Evan Anderson, had no ties whatsoever to Spectra 
Construction Company. Therefore, at the time the building permit for the improvements 
to the Mellen lot was requested by the defendant he was not a licensed general contractor, 
nor was he acting as an agent for Spectra Construction Company, the licensed contractor 
listed on the building permit application. 
In April of 1997, O. J. Peck contacted the Mellens after Mr. Peck learned that the 
Mellens were unhappy that some of the work specified in the contract had not been 
completed by the defendant. The Mellens became upset because Washington County 
Building Inspector Bill Weaver required that additional work be completed on the site. 
Following this meeting with Mr. and Mr. Mellon, a formal investigation by the Division 
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of Occupational and Professional Licensing was started. 
When Inspector O. J. Peck completed his investigation, the results were submitted 
to the Washington County Attorney's Office for review. An Information was filed on 
July 22, 1997, and a jury trial was held before the Honorable G. Rand Beacham, District 
Court Judge, on September 15-16, 1997. Following its deliberations on September 16, 
1997, the jury returned verdicts of guilty to the charges of Acting as a Contractor without 
a License, Utah Code Annotated §58-55-501(1), and Applying for a Building Permit 
without a License, Utah Code Annotated §58-55-501(4). Sentencing was held on 
September 18, 1997, and defendant subsequently filed this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The State contends that neither the trial court judge nor the jury committed the 
errors claimed by appellant. In the first six claims of error, appellant alleges that the trial 
judge erred, and correctly states that the standard of review is for correctness. However, 
appellant fails to marshal any evidence to support any of the claimed errors, nor does 
appellant support these claims with any type of authority from statutes or case law. 
As to the seventh issue, appellant claims that the jury erred in finding him guilty, 
and again correctly states that the standard of review is that the jury verdict should be 
reviewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. But again the appellant failed to 
marshal evidence to support this claim, and did not support his arguments with authority 
from either statutes or case law. 
5 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE I: DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN NOT GRANTING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS MADE AT 
CLOSE OF PLAINTIFF'S CASE IN CHIEF, FOR 
FAILURE TO PROVE THE ELEMENTS OF THE 
CHARGES OF CONTRACTING WITHOUT A 
LICENSE, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §58-55-501(1) 
AND FILING FOR A BUILDING PERMIT WITHOUT 
A LICENSE, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §58-55-
501(4)? 
The trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss made at the 
conclusion of the State's case. The standard of review set out by defendant is correctly 
stated in State v. Snyder, 932 P.2d 120, 125 (Utah App.1997), "[T]he propriety of a trial 
court's decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss is a question of law that we review 
for correctness," citing Tiede v. State, 915 P.2d 500, 502 (Utah 1996). Defendant's 
argument, however, is not supported by the facts or by any authorities. 
However, the State contends that the first issue this Court should address is 
whether the jury erred in reaching a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In fact, 
if this Court either upholds or overturns the jury's verdict, the trial court's decision to 
dismiss or proceed becomes moot. The standard of review for jury trials is that the 
appellate court "must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and will 
interfere only when the evidence is so lacking and insubstantial that a reasonable person 
could not have possibly reached a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Blubaugh, 
904 P.2d 688, 694 (Utah App. 1995), (citations omitted). 
In fact, even errors of the District Court at preliminary stages of a prosecution are 
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"cured if the defendant is later convicted beyond a reasonable doubt," State v. Quas, 837 
P.2d 565, 566 (Utah App. 1992); United States v. Mechank 475 U.S. 66, 70, 89 L.Ed.2d 
50, 56, 106 S.Ct. 938 (1986). Therefore, the State contends that defendant has put the 
cart before the horse on this issue. But having done so, defendant still presents no case 
law, statutes, or evidence to support his contention that the trial judge erred in denying 
his motion to dismiss. 
In the statutes at issue in this action, Utah Code Ann. §58-55-501 (1) and (4), 
unlawful conduct is defined as including: 
(1) engaging in a construction trade, acting as a contractor, or 
representing oneself to be engaged in a construction trade or to be acting as 
a contractor in a construction trade requiring licensure, unless the person 
doing any of these is appropriately licensed or exempted from licensure 
under this chapter. Utah Code Ann. §58-55-501(1); 
(4) applying for or obtaining a building permit either for oneself or 
another when not licensed or exempted from licensure as a contractor under 
this chapter. Utah Code Ann. §58-55-501(4) 
Because the defendant stipulated at trial that he did not fall under the exemptions from 
licensure under this chapter, we can concentrate on defendant's actions as they relate to 
the statutes themselves. 
The evidence clearly supports the trial court's decision to deny defendant's motion 
to dismiss at the conclusion of the State's case. The fact that the defendant was not a 
licensed general contractor at the time of the offenses is evident from Exhibit No. 3, 
which clearly shows that neither the defendant, Evan Anderson, nor his company, 
Construction and Sales Mgmt. Inc., had an appropriate general contractor's license during 
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the time periods in question. Evan Anderson signed the contract (Exhibit No. 2) on June 
12, 1996, for himself individually. By the terms of the contract the defendant agreed to 
take care of all the work required on the Mellen lot, either personally or by contracting 
with others to do the work, in return for payment of the contract sum of $136,384.45. 
A general contractor is defined in Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition 
(1990) as "one who contracts for the construction of an entire building or 
project, rather than a portion of the work. The general contractor hires 
subcontractors (e.g., plumbing, electrical, etc.), coordinates all work and is 
responsible for payment to subcontractors. Also called "prime" contractor. 
Utah Code Ann. §58-55-102 (12) defines a general building contractor as: 
[A] person licensed under this chapter as a general building contractor 
qualified by education, training, experience, and knowledge to perform or 
superintend construction of structures for the support, shelter, and enclosure 
of persons, animals, chattels, or moveable property of any kind or any 
components of that construction except plumbing, electrical, and 
mechanical, for which the general building contractor shall employ the 
services of a contractor licensed in that particular specialty, except that a 
general building contractor engaged in the construction of single-family and 
multifamily residences up to four units may perform the mechanical and 
hire a licensed plumber or electrician as an employee. The division may by 
rule exclude general building contractors from engaging in the performance 
of other construction specialties in which there is represented a substantial 
risk to the public health, safety, and welfare, and for which a license is 
required unless that general building contractor holds a valid license in that 
specialty classification. 
From the evidence presented at trial it is evident that the defendant, Evan 
Anderson, held himself out to be a general contractor. Other evidence provided or 
produced at trial, both through Exhibit No. 3 and the testimony of O. J. Peck and Bill 
Weaver, showed that the defendant was not licensed to enter into such a contract. 
As to the second count in the Information, Applying for a Building Permit without 
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a License, it is clear from the foregoing statements that the defendant did not have the 
appropriate contractor's license at the time he applied for a building permit covering the 
work to be performed on the Mellen property. As shown in Exhibit No. 5, when the 
defendant applied for a building permit, he duped Washington County into believing that 
the contract was to be performed by Spectra Construction Company. Washington County 
Building Inspector Bill Weaver testified that when he asked Evan Anderson about his 
relationship with Spectra, "He [Evan Anderson] told me, if I recall it right, that he had 
bought in a partnership or something. He had bought into this company and he was now 
a portion of Spectra Construction." (Transcript 186 p. 58, lines 7-10) However, at trial 
Charles C. Moore, who is the sole shareholder of Spectra Construction, stated that he 
(Mr. Moore) had never met the defendant, Evan Anderson. (Transcript 186, pp. 88, 91) 
The foregoing evidence meets all the elements of the statutes at issue and allowed 
the trial judge to conclude that the issues were ripe for decision, and that the trial should 
proceed to the next phase. The trial court was correct and did not err in denying the 
defendant's motion to dismiss. 
ISSUE II: DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR WHEN IT DID NOT 
GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A BILL OF 
PARTICULARS? 
The State contends that the trial court was correct in not granting defendant's 
motion for a bill of particulars. The defendant is correct in his statement that the standard 
of review by this Court is for correctness of the trial court's decision. However, 
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defendant's arguments are in error and are not supported by any statutory or case law 
authority. 
Rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states: 
(e) When facts not set out in an information or indictment are required to 
inform a defendant of the nature and cause of the offense charged, so as to 
enable him to prepare his defense, the defendant may file a written motion 
for a bill of particulars. The motion shall be filed at arraignment or within 
ten days thereafter, or at such later time as the court may permit. The court 
may, on its own motion, direct the filing of a bill of particulars. A bill of 
particulars may be amended or supplemented at any time subject to such 
conditions as justice may require. The request for and the contents of a bill 
of particulars shall be limited to a statement of the factual information 
needed to set for the essential elements of the particular offense charge. 
The question that arises from rule 4(e) is whether the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying defendant's motion for a bill of particulars. As the defendant 
provided no transcript of the hearing where this motion was denied, it is impossible to 
know with certainty on what grounds the court denied defendant's motion. However, The 
State would argue that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to grant 
defendant's motion. 
The Court of Appeals will generally "assume regularity of proceedings below 
when defendant fails to provide an adequate record on appeal." Blubaugh, at 699. 
Although defendant re-alleges his version of the facts, this alone is not sufficient to 
challenge the trials court's findings or conclusions. Nor does defendant ever plead that he 
was prejudiced by the trial court's denial of his request for a bill of particulars. 
One other fact that supports the State's position that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion is that the defendant was provided full discovery. The defendant received an 
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Information which complied in all respects with rule 4(b), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure by "giving the statutory or common law name of the offense, or by stating in 
concise terms the definition of the offense sufficient to give the defendant notice of the 
charge." The Information likewise met the requirement of setting out the nature and 
cause of the offense charged which would enable the defendant to prepare a defense, as 
required by Blubaugh at 701. In accordance with the open file policy of the Washington 
County Attorney's Office, the defendant received copies of all evidentiary documents in 
the prosecutor's file, and on February 11, 1998, counsel for the State of Utah mailed via 
certified mail to the defendant a copy of the Information on file in this action, and a copy 
of the Case Summary prepared by Inspector O. J. Peck with all attachments. 
It is clear from the limited record available that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion as set out in rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
ISSUE III: DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN TERMINATING A 
PREVIOUS CONSOLIDATION ORDER? 
The trial court did not err when it rescinded a previous order of joinder and 
ordered separate trials in two pending cases in which the defendant is the defendant. The 
decision to join or sever is within the court's sound discretion. State v. Haga, 735 P.2d 
44, 47 (Utah 1987). It is also important to note that the defendant provides no transcript 
for review, and therefore the court will generally assume the "regularity of proceedings 
below when defendant fails to provide an adequate record on appeal." Blubaugh at 699. 
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In addition, the cases the defendant sought to join involved different victims, 
different dates of offense, different witnesses, and different facts, which could easily have 
resulted in confusion at trial. Joinder is commonly made only when the offenses arise out 
of the same incident, which is not true in the two actions defendant sought to consolidate. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-8a-l. 
Defendant is also mistaken as to the standard of review, which is not correctness, 
but where it is "affirmatively shown that a defendant's right to a fair trial has been 
impaired" State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440, 445 (Utah 1986). This standard is neither 
argued nor proven by defendant. Therefore, this court should find that the trial court did 
not err in severing of the two cases for trial. 
ISSUE IV: DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR BY ALLOWING O. J. 
PECK, INVESTIGATOR WITH THE CONTRACTOR'S 
LICENSING SECTION OF THE UTAH DEPARTMENT 
OF COMMERCE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & 
PROFESSIONAL LICENSING, TO TESTIFY ABOUT 
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE LICENSING LAWS AND 
HOW THE DEFENDANT VIOLATED THESE LAWS? 
The trial court did not err in allowing O. J. Peck to testify at trial about his 
interpretation of the licensing laws as they apply to the defendant and his action. At trial 
the defendant at no time objected to the testimony of Mr. Peck concerning this 
investigator's interpretation of the law. Defendant claims on page 38 of his brief that this 
interpretation of the law covers pages 145 to 204 in the trial transcript. A thorough 
reading of the transcript shows that defendant was doing much of the questioning of Mr. 
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Peck during this period and defendant failed to preserve this issue for appeal. 
It should be noted that law enforcement officers in general are given powers to 
interpret the law and enforce it. In Peck v. Dunn, 574 P.2d 367, 369 (Utah 1978), the 
Supreme Court of Utah wrote, "It is our duty to assume that those who administer a 
statute will do so with reason and common sense, in accordance with it s language and 
intent; and further, that if there is a choice as to the matter of its interpretation and 
application that should be done in a manner which will make it constitutional, as opposed 
to one which will make it invalid." 
It is obvious from this statement that investigators have the authority to interpret 
the law and enforce it. This is what O. J. Peck testified to at trial, and the trial court 
made no error in allowing his testimony. 
ISSUE V: DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ALLOWING O. J. 
PECK, INVESTIGATOR WITH THE CONTRACTOR'S 
LICENSING SECTION OF THE UTAH DEPARTMENT 
OF COMMERCE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & 
PROFESSIONAL LICENSING, TO REFRESH HIS 
MEMORY FROM HIS REPORTS? 
The trial court did not err when it allowed O. J. Peck to review his notes to refresh 
his memory during his testimony. In fact, rule 612 of the Utah Rules of Evidence plainly 
states that a writing can be used for this purpose: 
If a witness uses a writing to refresh the witness' memory for the 
purposes of testifying, either 
(1) while testifying, or 
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(2) before testifying, if the court in its discretion determines it is 
necessary for the interests of justice, 
an adverse party is entitled to have the writing produced at a hearing, to 
inspect it, to cross-examine the witness thereon, and to introduce in 
evidence those portions which relating to the testimony of the witness. If it 
is claimed that the writing contains matters not related to the subject matter 
of the testimony the court shall examine the writing in camera, excise any 
portions not so related, and order delivery of the remainder to the party 
entitled thereto. Any portion withheld over objections shall be preserved 
and made available to the appellate court in the event of an appeal. If a 
writing is not produced or delivered pursuant to order under this rule, the 
court shall make any order justice requires, except that in criminal cases 
when the prosecution elects not to comply, the order shall be one striking 
the testimony or, if the court in its discretion determines that the interests of 
justice so require, declaring a mistrial. 
Refreshing a witness' memory is allowable, and this was what was done at trial. 
Defendant would have this court believe that O. J. Peck just read his notes into the record 
at trial. This, of course, was not the case. The defendant did make an objection to this 
testimony at trial (Transcript 187, p. 127, lines 18-20), but later withdrew the objection 
(Transcript 187, p. 128, line 8). However defendant did object (Transcript 187 p. 151, 
lines 23-23) to O. J. Peck refreshing his memory from his investigative report, stating that 
the report was prepared after the investigation was completed. In so doing, the defendant 
made an objection which has no basis in the law. Reports are summaries of 
investigations which by their very nature cannot be prepared until after the activities have 
been completed. Investigators prepare these reports for use by their office staff, by 
attorneys for both plaintiff and defendant, and for other interested or intended parties at 
the conclusion of the investigations. Evidence shows that the formulation of this report 
was based on O. J. Peck's investigations (Transcript 187, pp. 152-153, lines 18-20). 
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Therefore, the trial court in no way violated rule 612 of the rules of evidence when it 
allowed O. J. Peck to refresh his memory by referring to his report. 
ISSUE VI: DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ALLOWING O. J. 
PECK, INVESTIGATOR WITH THE CONTRACTOR'S 
LICENSING SECTION OF THE UTAH DEPARTMENT 
OF COMMERCE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & 
PROFESSIONAL LICENSING, TO TESTIFY ABOUT 
OTHER DATES WHEN THE DEFENDANT HAD BEEN 
LICENSED? 
It is clear that the trial court did not err in allowing O. J. Peck to testify about dates 
on which the defendant was licensed. In fact, this issue was not preserved for appeal 
because the defendant did not at any point object to the introduction of testimony 
concerning the different dates when the defendant was licensed. The defendant cites no 
authority as to why this testimony would not be admissible, and gives no arguments as to 
how such testimony would be prejudicial to this case. The Utah Supreme Court stated in 
State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239 (Utah 1992) that: 
In reviewing a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence under rule 
403, we will not overturn the court's determination unless it was an "abuse 
of discretion."... To state the matter more precisely, we review the trial 
court's 403 ruling admitting or denying admission to evidence by deciding 
where, as a matter of law, the trial court's decision that "the unfairly 
prejudicial potential of the evidence outweighs [or does not outweigh] its 
probativeness" was beyond the limits of reasonability." 
Since the issue at trial was whether the defendant was licensed at the time of the 
contracting work and the issuance of the building permit, this evidence was probative. To 
show that the defendant, who claimed to be licensed at the time, was, in fact, not then so 
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licensed but later became licensed is not prejudicial but very probative, and was properly 
admitted into evidence. 
ISSUE VII: DID THE JURY ERR IN FINDING THE DEFENDANT 
GUILTY OF CONTRACTING WITHOUT A LICENSE, 
IN VIOLATION OF UCA §58-55-501(1), AND 
APPLYING FOR A BUILDING PERMIT WITHOUT A 
LICENSE, IN VIOLATION OF UCA §58-55-501(4)? 
The jury did not err in finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was 
guilty of contracting without a license and applying for a building permit without a 
license. 
The standard for review provides that the Court of Appeals "must view the 
evidence in light most favorable to verdict and will interfere only when evidence is so 
lacking and insubstantial that a reasonable person could not possibly have reached a 
verdict beyond a reasonable doubt." Blubaugh, 694 (citations omitted). 
The evidence clearly shows that the defendant was acting as a general contractor, 
by talking like one, accepting money like one, controlling the building on the Mellen 
property like one, paying money out like one, and that he was not a licensed general 
contractor while he was doing these things. The evidence also clearly shows that at the 
time the defendant applied for and obtained a building permit he was not licensed as a 
general contractor. Therefore, the evidence clearly would allow a jury to find the 
defendant guilty in this case. And even if the defendant could argue that there are 
alternative hypotheses, it would not be enough to set aside the verdict. Blubaugh states 
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that ,fthe existence of one or more alternative reasonable hypothesis does not necessarily 
prevent the jury from concluding that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." 
Id, at 695. The State contends that we don't even have any question as to other 
hypotheses to rule on in this case. 
In fact, the State contends that the jury did convict the defendant upon proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt. In Hamilton, the Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed that 
reviewing a jury verdict, the appellate court need not be convinced beyond reasonable 
doubt, but rather "must uphold the jury verdict unless reasonable minds could not have 
found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime." Id, at 236, 
footnote 1 (citations omitted). 
The defendant has provided no authority, evidence, or valid argument as to how 
this jury could be so wrong that they found him guilty by less than reasonable doubt and 
in so doing were in error. In State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70, 87 (Utah 1993) the Supreme 
Court stated, "[w]e will affirm the jury verdict as long as there is some evidence, 
including reasonable inferences, from which findings of all requisite elements of the 
crime can reasonably be made1" citing State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985). 
In this case the credible evidence presented to the jury greatly exceeds this 
minimal standard, and the jury verdict should be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant has failed to marshal any evidence or authority to support the seven 
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issues raised in his appeal, and his conviction should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2nd day of June, 1999. 
U-**Cc fe 
WADE FARRAWAY 
Deputy Waslaington Coxmty Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this lml day of June, 1999,1 personally caused two 
true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee to be deposited in the U. S. 
Mail, addressed as follows first class postage prepaid: 
Mr. Evan Anderson 
3700 East Highway 144 
New Harmony, UT 84747 
WADE FARRAWAY 
Deputy Washington County Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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ADDENDUM 
Exhibit No. 2 
Signed Proposal Dated June 12, 1999 
Exhibit No. 3 
Certificate of Custodian of Records 
Exhibit No. 5 
Building Permit Application 
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P R O P O S A L 
DATE: June 12, 1996 
TO: Joe and Myrle Mellen 
746 W. Monte Blanco Dr 
SLC, Utah 84123 
FROM: Construction and Sales Management Inc. 
3700 East Hwy 144 
New Harmony, Utah, 84757 
Phone 801-586-3478 
Project Description: New Home with lot improvements 
We are prepared to offer you the following items, 
including the Skyline home you have picked out. Many of the 
items are work we are licensed to preform ourselves. The 
ones marked with an * are the items that will need to be 
contracted out to specialty contractors directly. On these 
items we are willing to act in a consulting capacity, to act 
as your agent in designing, scheduling, and inspection. You 
will note that we have added a 3% fee on each of the 
contract bid amounts for this service. Contracts will need 
to be finalized upon your acceptance for each item. They 
are as follows: 
Lot purchase: Completed previously 
*Home purchase (our price 
per my bid w/original 
options) $100,000.00 
Additional options see 
attached list 2,185.00 
Utah State ealss tax... 3,372.10 
Omit fridg, oven; add 
double front doors and 
up grade carpet....(net)....+ 345.00 
Total $105,902.10 
•Concrete for home, garage 
and shed $ 11,480.00 
3% fee 344.40 
Total 11,8 24.40 
*Garage 28'x32' labor and 
Materia] $ 9,273.28 
*Shed 20'x20' 3,870.37 
Total out building 13,143.65 
3% fee.... 394.30 
Total 13,537.95 
Excavating and grading 1,200.00 
Septic with perc test 1,850.00 
Driveway,16'xl00• (no pavement).... 300.00 
Asphalt paving 15x100 1500 sqft @ $1.00... 1,500.00 
Water trench/1"pvc/backfill 100'+ 
2 freeze hydrants 195.00 
Power trench/backfill 75.00 
Total...(bottom line) $136,384.45 
Submitted by: Approved by: 
Evan Anderson Joe Mellen 
'*
 ; y ^ ^i"%£Ce* 
Myrle #4elen 
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CERTIFICATE OF CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that a diligent search made of all records maintained by the State 
of Utah, Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, reveals whether an official 
contractor license has ever been issued to: CONSTRUCTION & SALES MGMT INC AND 
EVAN ANDERSON, and whether such license, if any, is current or has expired. 
It is hereby certified that license number 96-321577-5501 was issued by this office for 
said licensee on 5-28-96, said license is CURRENT with an expiration date of 7-31-99 
EVAN ANDERSON WAS LICENSED AS FOLLOWS: 
S310 EXCAVATION & GRADING ON 5-28-96 
S330 LANDSCAPING ON 5-28-96 
S410 PIPELINE & CONDUIT ON 5 28-96 
R200 FACTORY BUILT HOUSING SET UP ON 5-29-97 AND 
S216 RESIDENTIAL SEWER CONNECT/SEPTIC TANK ON 5-29-97 
AND LENARD WRIGHT QUALIFIED FOR THE BlOO GENERAL BUILDING ON 5-29-91 
This license was issued on the basis of EVAN ANDERSON passing the State of Utah exams 
and Contractor's Business/Law and Trade, if required, licensing examination, examination scores 
are: not available. 
Passing score in the State of Utah is 70%. All Utah examinations are given by National 
Assessment Institute (NAI)3 further examination information given upon request. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am a public officer of the State of Utah by virtue of Title 
58-1 Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), and that I am the legal keeper and custodian of 
all records pertaining to the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing and if such 
records do exist anywhere they would be in my control and possession 
THIS certificate is made for use as court evidence or otherwise in compliance with RULE 
44(a) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, 1 have attached my seal of office on October 27, 1997. 
Jarfe Newton, Licensing Specialist 
Division of O c p ^ S t ^ ^ l & Professional Licensing 
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WASHINGTON COUNTY 
BUILDING PERMIT APPLICATION 
(Applicant to fill out Numbered spaces) 
3093 
Job Address 
224 So 3900 E New Harmony 
1. Owner 
J o e & M y r l e Me 1 l e n 
Legal Description 
NEHR-4-3 
2. Owner Address 
746 W Monte B l a n c a Dr SLC U t a h 
Zip Phono 
84123 8 0 1 - 2 6 6 - 0 3 4 5 
3. Contractor 
Spectra Const Co 
Phone 
8 0 1 - 5 9 9 - 1 1 1 1 
License No. 
229358 
4. Electrical Contractor License No. 
5. Plumbing Contractor License No. 
6. Class of work X New I I Addition Alteration! Repair! I Move 
TEMP. DWG. 
7. Use of Building 
h o m e / g a r a g e / s h e d Valuation of Work $ 6 4 2 5 6 - 0 0 
8. Notes and Special Conditions 
M a n u f a c t u r e d h o m e - 2 4 9 6 sq Plumbing: 0 . 0 0 
f t = 4 9 9 2 0 G a r a g e - 8 9 6 Electrical: 5.00 
sqft=14336 storage shed 
HCP .002% of Valuation 
71-2850-827 128.51 
400 sqft =6400 (Red Mountian 
Building Permit 
12-3221-000 6 6 0 . 0 0 
S e r v i c e - S e t up C o n t r a c t o r - 9 5 - 2 
1% Surcharge 
71-2860-983 6 . 6 5 
9 1 4 6 3 - 5 5 0 1 H C & S Mgmt PLAN CHECK FEE 0 . 0 0 
TOTAL 
Permit Fee 8 0 0 . 1 6 
I n c . - 9 6 - 3 2 1 5 7 7 - 5501 
Type of Const 
FRAME 
Occupancy Group 
R 
Division 
NOTICE 
SPECIAL PERMITS MUST BE OBTAINED TO CUT UP 
STREETS IN MAKING SEWER & WATER CONNEC-
TIONS, DRIVEWAYS, CURBS, ETC. 
THIS PERMIT BECOMES NULL AND VOID IF WORK OR 
CONSTRUCTION AUTHORIZED IS NOT COMMENCED 
WITHIN 180 DAYS OR IF CONSTRUCTION OR WORK 
IS SUSPENDED OR ABANDONED FOR A PERIOD OF 
180DAYS AT ANYTIME AFTERWORKIS COMMENCED. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I HAVE READ AND EXAM-
INED THIS APPLICATION AND KNOWTHE SAME TO BE 
TRUE AND CORRECT. ALL PROVISIONS OF LAWS 
AND ORDINANCES GOVERNING THIS TYPE OF WORK 
WILL BE COMPLIED WITH WHETHER SPECIFIED 
HEREIN OR NOT. THE GRANTING OF A PERMIT DOES 
NOT PRESUME TO GIVE AUTHORITY TO VIOLATE OR 
CANCEL THE PROVISIONS OF ANY OTHER STATE OR 
LOCAL LAW REGULATING CONSTRUCTION OR THE 
PERFORMANCE OF CONSTRUCTION. 
Signature of Contractor or Aumonzed Agent (Date) 
Signature of Owner (If Owner Builder) (Date) 
Size of Building (Total Sq Ft) 
3392 
No. of Stories 
1 
Max Occ. Load 
Fire Sprinklers Required Yes L No 
No. of Dwelling Units 
0 
Special Approvals 
ZONING 
HEALTH DEPT. 
FIRE DEPT. 
SOIL REPORT 
WATER 
RIGHT OF WAY 
OTHER 
OFF STREET PARKING 
Covered X Uncovered 
Required 
YES 
YES 
YES 
Received 
YES 
YES 
YES 
Not Required 
X 
X 
When Properiy VaJidated (in thisjpace) This is Your Permit 
Approved By ( ^ ^ ^ U i U X ^ ' Application Date 9 • •J - 9 6 
Payment Received By 
~ t^fCc 
°"*?-is-9,; £-NOTE 1 % Surchargefotate Departmen  p\ Commerce, Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing 
1 Q "3 
